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There has been a resurgence of interest in defining the circumstances leading to mem-
ory modifications. Studies have shown that reactivating a supposedly stable memory
re-introduces a time-limited window of plasticity during which presentation of interfer-
ing material can cause long-term memory changes. The present study asks whether such
memory changes can be prevented if people are instructed to forget the memory before
the new material is encoded. Participants learned a set of objects. After 48 h, they were
reminded of this learning episode, and learned another set of objects. Again 48 h later, they
recalled the first (Exp. 1) or second set (Exp. 3). As shown previously, a reminder caused
intrusions from the second set into recall of the first set. Here I show that the instruction
to forget the first set significantly diminished intrusions from the second set, especially
when the instruction was given before the new set was encoded in the second session.
Experiment 2 suggests that the reduced intrusions were due to list segregation/isolation,
rather than temporarily inhibited access to Set 1. Taken together, the study shows that
the attempt to forget a memory can immunize it such that the presentation of interfering
material has limited effects, and the memory can be recalled unchanged in the future.This
is important when veridical memory is essential, such as in eyewitness testimonies.
Keywords: memory reconsolidation, intentional forgetting, memory modification, list learning, episodic memory
INTRODUCTION
Memory does not always provide an accurate record of the past.
For instance, misinforming people about details of a witnessed
event can cause them to adopt these false details as their true
memories (the misinformation effect, see e.g., Loftus, 2005 for a
review). Memory reconsolidation might account for such memory
changes (Hardt et al., 2010). The reconsolidation account pro-
poses that every time a memory is reactivated (e.g., by questions
about a previous event), the memory becomes fragile again and
can be modified or updated. In order for the memory to “survive,”
it needs to undergo a re-stabilization process called reconsolida-
tion. This process has been extensively studied in animals (for
reviews, see e.g., Nader and Hardt, 2009; Besnard et al., 2012),
illuminating its behavioral consequences as well as the molecular
and cellular underpinnings. Much less is known about recon-
solidation in humans (cf. Schiller and Phelps, 2011). Hupbach
et al. (2007) developed a paradigm to study reconsolidation-
type processes in human episodic memory: participants learn
a set of objects in Session 1. Forty-eight hours later (Session
2), they are either reminded of the previous learning episode
or not, and then learn a second set of objects. When asked to
recall Set 1 in Session 3 another 48 h later, reminded participants
show a high number of intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1, while
participants who were not reminded show very few intrusions.
Importantly, this effect happens involuntarily and participants are
not aware of intrusions. In fact, they are highly confident that
intruded Set 2 items belong to Set 1 (Hupbach et al., 2009).
We have interpreted the intrusion effect as evidence for mem-
ory reconsolidation: when Set 1 is reactivated during Session 2,
memory for Set 1 re-enters a vulnerable, plastic state in which
new items can be incorporated into the reactivated memory
representations.
In contrast to the involuntary, automatic modification of mem-
ory that is common to the effect described above, memories are
also under voluntary control, at least to some extent, as shown
by research on retrieval suppression (for a review, see Ander-
son and Levy, 2009), and directed forgetting (DF, for reviews
see, e.g., MacLeod, 1998; Bäuml, 2008). In the present study I
ask whether involuntary memory changes can be prevented, and
whether memories can be preserved in its original form, when peo-
ple are instructed to forget the original memory before potentially
interfering material is presented. More specifically, I combined the
reconsolidation paradigm (that leads to integration of new infor-
mation into the reactivated memory) with a list-wise DF paradigm
(in which people actively attempt to forget a recently encoded
memory).
In the so-called list-method DF paradigm, participants are
either instructed to forget a just learned list because it will suppos-
edly not be tested later, or to continue to remember this list for a
later memory test. Then, all participants are asked to memorize a
second list. In comparison to the remember condition, the instruc-
tion to forget causes impaired memory for the first list (costs), and
improved memory for the second list (benefits of directed forget-
ting). Initially, it was assumed that the forget cue causes List 1 to
be differentiated or segregated from List 2 items, which decreases
proactive interference and allows participants to devote all their
mnemonic activities to selectively rehearse List 2 (Bjork, 1970).
Retrieval inhibition was later introduced as the crucial mechanism,
and has remained the most widely accepted explanation for the DF
effect (Geiselman et al., 1983; see also Bäuml, 2008). According to
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the retrieval inhibition account, the forget cue temporarily inhibits
or blocks retrieval routes to the to-be-forgotten information, while
leaving the actual strength of the memory unaffected.
Building on the original list segregation theory by Bjork (1970),
Sahakyan and Kelley (2002) proposed the contextual change
hypothesis, an alternative account of list-wise DF. They assume
that the forget instruction causes an internal context shift, which
participants accomplish by either focusing on something task-
unrelated or deliberately sampling new contextual elements. Set
differentiation is assumed to be a function of the context shift.
Set differentiation is, however, not sufficient for the DF effect.
Critically, the context at retrieval mismatches the List 1 encod-
ing context, which negatively affects recall of List 1. Support
for this account comes from the finding that when participants
are instructed to mentally reinstate the List 1 encoding context,
memory improves (Sahakyan and Kelley, 2002). Furthermore,
interventions that potentially change the internal context have
similar effects as the forget cue, such as imagining being invisi-
ble, mentally walking through your parents’ house (Sahakyan and
Kelley, 2002), daydreaming (Delaney et al., 2010), chatting with
the experimenter or wiping a computer screen (Mulji and Bodner,
2010).
Taken together, research shows that memories are often invol-
untarily modified (and unnoticed by the beholder), but that
modifications can also be intentionally initiated. This raises the
interesting question whether involuntary changes could be pre-
vented if people engaged in intentional processes counteracting
those changes. Reconsolidation research has shown that reacti-
vated memories are fragile and prone to modification. Maybe
modification of those memories can be prevented if people are
asked to suppress or forget those reactivated memories. The
present study tests this hypothesis.
EXPERIMENT 1
In most list-wise DF studies, the forget cue follows List 1 encod-
ing, and immediately afterward, List 2 is presented. After a brief
interval, participants are then asked to recall the first or the second
list. In addition to the difference in material (objects instead of
words that are commonly used in DF studies), the object-learning
paradigm differs in two other important ways from those stud-
ies: (1) final recall of Set 1 is not tested immediately after Set 2
presentation, but is tested in a third session that takes place 48 h
after Session 2, (2) the two sets of objects are not presented in a
single-session, but in two separate sessions with a 48 h delay sepa-
rating them. Therefore, it was less clear when exactly to present the
forget cue in the time interval between Set 1 and Set 2 learning.
I decided to instruct participants to forget Set 1 either in Ses-
sion 1, immediately after they had learned Set 1, or in Session 2,
before they encoded the second set of objects. Presenting the for-
get cue after Set 1 encoding could affect post-learning stabilization
processes for Set 1 memory (i.e., memory consolidation; see e.g.,
review by McGaugh, 2000). Instructing participants to forget Set
1 in Session 2, before presenting the second set, could inhibit or
block access to Set 1 memory (e.g., Geiselman et al., 1983). This
in turn could prevent its modification, such that the usual intru-
sion effect would not be observed. Both possibilities were tested in
Experiment 1.
In all experiments in the present study, I used a spatial con-
text reminder to reactivate memory for Set 1 in Session 2. This
reminder involves bringing participants back to the same room
(spatial context) in which they learned Set 1. This reminder has
been proven to be the crucial component necessary to reactivate
Set 1 memory and to cause intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1 (Hup-
bach et al., 2008). Additionally, participants worked with the same
experimenter on all 3 days.
EXPERIMENT 1A
Methods
Design and participants. All participants took part in three sep-
arate sessions. The temporal placement of the forget cue was the
only independent variable that was varied between-subjects. I pre-
sented participants with the instruction to forget Set 1 either after
they learned the first set of objects in Session 1 (FC-1), or before
they learned the second set of objects in Session 2 (FC-2), or not
at all (control). The last group’s performance provided a control
against which I compared the experimental groups’ memory per-
formance. Thirty-six undergraduate students (age range 18–35;
20 females, 16 males) from Lehigh University participated in the
experiment. They received course credit or financial compensation
for participation. Twelve participants were randomly assigned to
each condition. All experiments were approved by the Institu-
tional Review Board, and participants gave written consent before
the experiment started.
Materials
Set 1 and Set 2 materials each consisted of 20 unrelated objects. Set
1: balloon, bow, calculator, toy car, crayon, cup, dice, feather, flash-
light, flower, glue, key, sock, sponge, spoon, sunglasses, teabag,
tennis ball, toothbrush, whistle. Set 2: apple, band-aid, battery,
book, cassette tape, cellular phone, comb, dollar bill, elephant,
envelope, paper clip, puzzle piece, rock, shovel, straw, thread, tissue,
toy pot, watch, zipper.
Procedure
The experimental conditions for all experiments are outlined in
Table 1.
The three sessions took place on Monday, Wednesday, and Fri-
day of the same week, i.e., sessions were separated by 48 h. All
sessions were administered in the same room by the same experi-
menter. At the beginning of Session 1, participants were told that
they would have to memorize different lists of objects in each
session. Participants were tested one at a time.
In Session 1, the experimenter pulled out one object at a time
from a bag in random order and placed it in a distinctive basket.
Participants were asked to name each object and remember it for
a later memory test. After all 20 objects (Set 1) were placed into
the basket the experimenter hid the basket and asked the partic-
ipants to remember as many objects as possible. This procedure
was repeated until the participants remembered at least 17 of the
20 objects or until a maximum of four learning trials was reached.
Afterward, participants in the FC-1 group were told to forget the
objects they had just learned, because memory for these objects
would not be tested again, and because forgetting them would
optimize learning of the new set in the next session.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 32 | 2
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hupbach When forgetting preserves memory
Table 1 | Overview of experimental conditions in experiment 1a, 1b, 2, and 3.
Experiment Session 1 Session 2 Session 3
Exp. 1a
3 groups: FC-1,
FC-2, control
Encode set 1
FC-1: “I would like you to forget the objects you just
learned. On Wednesday you will learn a new set of
objects, and attempting to remember today’s set may
interfere with your memory for the 2nd set on
Wednesday. Today’s set is not important to remember
for the rest of the experiment, but the set you will
learn on Wednesday will be important to remember.”
FC-2: “I would like you to forget the objects you
learned on Monday. Today you will learn a new set of
objects, and attempting to remember the objects
from Monday may interfere with your ability to
memorize today’s objects. The objects from Monday
are not important for the rest of the experiment, but
the objects you learn today will be important to
remember”
Control: No special instruction
Encode Set 2
Recall set 1
Exp. 1b
3 groups: FC-1,
FC-2, R
Encode set 1
FC-1: see above
FC-2: see above
R: “The objects you learned on Monday are still
important to remember for a later memory test. Today,
I will present a second set of objects to you that you
should also keep in memory. In other words, both
sets of objects are important to remember.”
Encode set 2
Recall set 1
Exp. 2
2 groups: FC-2, R
Encode set 1 FC-2: see above
R: see above
Encode Set 2
Recall Set 1
Exp. 3
3 groups: FC-1,
FC-2, control
Encode set 1
FC-1: see above
FC-2: see above
R: see above
Encode set 2
Recall set 2
Forty-eight hours after Session 1, Session 2 was administered, in
the same room and with the same experimenter as before. Thus, all
participants received a spatial context reminder (Hupbach et al.,
2008). Participants in the FC-2 group were told to forget the objects
from Session 1, because memory for these objects would not be
tested again, and because it would help them learn the new set.
The control group did not receive any specific instructions con-
cerning Set 1. All participants then encoded a second set of 20
objects (Set 2). All objects were placed in front of the participants,
who were asked to name each object. After all objects had been
named, participants were given another 30 s to study them. Then,
the experimenter removed the objects, and asked the participants
to recall as many of the objects as possible. The study procedure
was repeated until participants recalled at least 17 objects, or for a
maximum of four learning trials.
In Session 3, participants were instructed to recall as many
objects as possible from Session 1 only, and the experimenter noted
the remembered objects. This procedure was repeated for a total
of four consecutive recall trials, with 30-s delays between trials.
Results
Learning set 1 and set 2. In order to assess potential differences
in initial learning between the different groups, I analyzed the
number of trials to reach criterion (criterion: recall a minimum
of 17 objects). A 3 (Condition: FC-1, FC-2, control)× 2 (Set: Set
1 vs. Set 2) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of
Set [F(1, 33)= 4.83, MSE= 0.414,p< 0.035]. Participants needed
fewer encoding trials to learn Set 2 (M = 2.56) than to learn Set
1 (M = 2.89), reflecting either a general training effect, and/or
that the learning procedure for Set 2 was superior to the learn-
ing procedure used for Set 1 encoding. Importantly, learning was
comparable in all three conditions: there was no main effect of
Condition, and no interaction between Set and Condition (both
Fs< 1).
Set 1 recall. The mean percentage of objects recalled from Set
1 and the mean percentage of objects falsely recalled from Set 2
(intrusions) are displayed in Figure 1A. The number of objects
recalled from Set 1 were analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with
Condition (FC-1, FC-2, control) as the between-subjects vari-
able and Retrieval Trial (1–4) as the within-subjects variable.
There was a significant effect of Trial [F(3, 99)= 9.74, MSE= 1.23,
p< 0.01], reflecting a linear increase in recalled items with trials
[F(1, 33)= 18.75, MSE= 1.80, p< 0.01]. Neither the main effect
for Condition nor the interaction between Trial and Condition
reached significance (F ≤ 2.31, p≥ 0.12).
Intrusions. The number of intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1 recall
were also analyzed with a mixed ANOVA. There was a significant
effect of Trial [F(3, 99)= 3.29, MSE= 1.63, p= 0.024], reflecting
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FIGURE 1 | Mean percentages of objects correctly and falsely recalled in
the different experimental groups in (A,B): the forget cue was either
given at the end of Session 1 or at the beginning of Session 2. In (A), the
control group did not receive any instructions about Set 1, whereas in (B), the
control group was instructed to keep remembering Set 1 at the beginning of
Session 2. Error bars represent standard errors of means. Note: Participants
were asked to recall objects from Set 1. Objects that were falsely recalled
from Set 2 are labeled as Intrusions.
a linear increase in recalled intrusions with trials [F(1, 33)= 4.40,
MSE= 2.79, p= 0.044], but no Trial by Condition interaction
(F = 1.13, p= 0.35). Most importantly, there was a significant
effect of Condition [F(1, 33)= 4.75, MSE= 23.09, p= 0.015].
Post hoc comparisons (Tukey) revealed that the FC-2 group had
significantly less intrusions than the control group (p= 0.014),
and marginally less intrusions than the FC-1 group (p= 0.10). The
FC-1 and control group did not differ in their rate of intrusions
(p= 0.66).
Discussion
The control group replicated previous findings that reminders
(spatial context & experimenter) cause new information to be
incorporated into the reactivated memory (e.g., Hupbach et al.,
2007): I found significant intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1 recall.
The forget cue did not affect the amount of objects correctly
recalled from Set 1, regardless of when it was presented (numer-
ically, the group that was instructed to forget Set 1 in Session 2
recalled more objects than any other group, but this difference
was not statistically significant and was not replicated in Exp.
1b).
Instructing participants to forget Set 1 in Session 1 did not affect
the amount of intrusions (but see Exp. 1b). Importantly, however,
instructing people to forget Set 1 prior to Set 2 encoding in Ses-
sion 2, i.e., 48 h after Set 1 was learned, caused intrusions to drop
significantly. This suggests that the forget cue can prevent mem-
ory modification when administered right before learning new
information. Because this is a new finding, and the sample size of
Experiment 1a was rather low, I decided to carry out a replica-
tion of the experiment with an increased sample size and a slightly
different control condition. In DF studies, the forget instruction
is usually compared to a remember instruction in which peo-
ple are told to keep remembering List 1 while learning List 2.
Accordingly, the control group in Experiment 1b was told at the
beginning of Session 2 (before encoding Set 2) that the previously
learned Set 1 was still important to keep in memory. The remem-
ber instruction was not given at the end of Session 1, because
a pilot study had shown that this caused people to rehearse Set
1 between Session 1 and Session 2, i.e., outside of experimental
control.
EXPERIMENT 1B
Methods
The same method was used as in Experiment 1a, with the only
exception that the control group was instructed to keep remem-
bering Set 1 before learning Set 2 in Session 2. Thus, the only
independent variable I varied between-subjects was the temporal
placement of the forget cue, which was either given after learn-
ing the first set of objects in Session 1 (FC-1), or before learning
the second set of objects in Session 2 (FC-2), or participants were
instructed to keep remembering Set 1 at the beginning of Session
2 (R-group).
Sixty undergraduate students (age range 18–35; 27 females, 33
males) from Lehigh University participated in the experiment.
They received course credit or financial compensation for par-
ticipation. Twenty participants were randomly assigned to each
condition. One participant (in the remember group) was excluded
from the final data set, because he stated that he had rehearsed the
objects between sessions. Thus, there were 20 participants in each
the FC-1 and FC-2 group, and 19 participants in the R-group.
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Results
Learning set 1 and set 2. In order to assess potential differences in
initial learning, I analyzed the number of trials to reach criterion
(criterion: recall a minimum of 17 objects). A 3 (Condition: FC-1,
FC-2, R)× (Set: Set 1 vs. Set 2) mixed ANOVA revealed a signif-
icant main effect of Set [F(1, 56)= 4.44, MSE= 0.774, p= 0.04].
Participants needed fewer learning trials to learn Set 2 (M = 3.37)
than to learn Set 1 (M = 3.71), replicating Experiment 1a. Addi-
tionally, as in Experiment 1a, learning was comparable in the three
groups: there was no main effect of Condition, and no interaction
between Set and Condition (Fs< 1).
Set 1 recall. The number of objects recalled from Set 1 (see
Figure 1B) was analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with Condition
as the between-subjects variable and Trial (1–4) as the within-
subjects variable. As in Experiment 1a, there was a significant
effect of Trial [F(3, 168)= 15.94, MSE= 1.55, p< 0.01], reflect-
ing a linear increase in recalled items with trials [F(1, 56)= 36.93,
MSE= 1.89, p< 0.01]. Neither the main effect for Condition nor
the interaction between Trial and Condition reached significance
(Fs< 1).
Intrusions. The number of intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1 recall
(see Figure 1B) was also analyzed with a mixed ANOVA. There was
a significant effect of Condition [F(1, 56)= 6.35, MSE= 24.83,
p< 0.01]. Post hoc comparisons (Tukey) revealed that both forget
groups significantly differed from the remember group (p= 0.04
for FC-1, p< 0.01 for FC-2), but there was no difference between
the two forget groups (p= 0.60). Neither the main effect of
Trial nor the interaction between Trial and Condition reached
significance (Fs< 1).
Discussion
Experiment 1b confirmed that the forget instruction does not
impair recall of Set 1, but significantly reduces the number of
intrusions from Set 2 into Set 1. The control groups of Experiment
1a (no forget cue) and 1b (remember-cue) showed very similar
results, which suggests that the remember instruction did neither
influence the veridical recall of Set 1 nor did it alter intrusions.
Recall of set 1. The finding that the forget instruction did not
affect recall of Set 1 when given immediately after Set 1 was
encoded suggests that a forget cue per se does not affect post-
encoding consolidation processes (see also Bjork and Geiselman,
1978). Pastötter and Bäuml (2007, 2010) have shown that forget-
ting critically depends on the presentation of new information
after the forget cue, and that the amount of List 2 encoding deter-
mines the magnitude of List 1 forgetting. Experiment 1 expands
these findings by showing that List 2 has to be encoded shortly
after List 1 was learned. Future research needs to define the critical
time window during which List 2 encoding needs to take place.
Additionally, in most directed forgetting studies final recall fol-
lows shortly after List 2 presentation. Hence, the internal context
during retrieval matches List 2 but mismatches List 1 encoding
context, which in turn leads to impaired recall for Set 1 (con-
text change account, Sahakyan and Kelley, 2002). In the current
study, recall was assessed 2 days after Set 2 was learned. The mental
context during retrieval is therefore different from the encoding
context in all of the groups, which explains why I did not find
impaired recall for Set 1 in the forget groups in comparison to
the control groups. The failure to observe such long-term costs of
directed forgetting also fits with the retrieval inhibition account
which assumes that the inhibition that is induced by the forget
instruction and that is responsible for the impoverished recall of
List 1 is only temporary in nature. Importantly, in the present
study the spatial context during recall always matched the encod-
ing context, which might also explain the lack of retrieval costs. I
will return to the interdependence of spatial and mental context
in the General Discussion.
Reduction of intrusions. Although the forget cue did not impair
Set 1 recall, it significantly reduced the amount of intrusions from
Set 2 into Set 1, i.e., it prevented memory modification. This was
observed in both Experiment 1a and 1b when the forget cue was
given in Session 2. When the forget cue was given immediately
after encoding of Set 1, the results were mixed: in comparison
to the remember group, I found diminished intrusions in Exper-
iment 1b, but not in Experiment 1a. Taken together, the forget
cue reliably reduces intrusions when given shortly before encod-
ing of potentially interfering material, but less reliably when given
immediately after encoding of the original memory set. In what
follows, I will discuss the inconsistent findings of the FC-1 group,
and possible explanations for the reduced intrusions in the FC-2
group.
The retrieval inhibition account offers an explanation for
the low intrusion rates in the FC-2 group, which I consis-
tently observed in Experiment 1a and b. Potentially, participants
responded to the forget instruction by engaging in inhibitory
processes which temporarily reduced access to Set 1 memory, thus
“deactivating”rather than reactivating it. In turn, this inhibition or
deactivation put Set 1 memory in a “safe” place, which prevented
the incorporation of new items into the memory. If this explana-
tion is correct, and the forget cue indeed blocked retrieval routes to
Set 1, then recall of Set 1 should be temporarily impaired if I tested
it immediately after Set 2 learning at the end of Session 2. This was
done in Experiment 2. The retrieval inhibition, however, cannot
explain why the forget cue also diminished intrusions when it was
presented right after Set 1 learning (although less so and only in
Exp. 1b) – inhibition should have been released by the time par-
ticipants returned for the second session. It is possible, however,
that some participants remembered the forget instruction from
the previous session, and thus “reinstated” it before learning Set 2.
An alternative explanation for the reduced intrusions can be
delineated from theories that assume that the forget cue causes
set differentiation or segregation, such as Bjork’s (1970) orig-
inal theory of DF or Sahakyan and Kelley’s (2002) contextual
change account. While Bjork did not specify the mechanism,
Sahakyan and Kelley (see also Lehman and Malmberg, 2009) pro-
pose contextual differentiation as the critical factor driving list
segregation. The assumed mental context change that follows the
forget cue segregates List 1 from List 2, which decreases proactive
interference from List 1 and diminishes cross-list intrusions (espe-
cially when item-specific encoding processes are used, Sahakyan,
2010; Sahakyan and Delaney, 2010). As stated above, because
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most directed forget studies are carried out as single-session
experiments, both components are reflected in the outcomes,
i.e., reduced memory expression (costs) and reduced intrusion
(although the latter less consistently, see Sahakyan and Delaney,
2010 for discussion). In contrast, when spread out over multiple
sessions as in the object-learning paradigm, the costs of DF are less
likely to be found, because the retrieval context (in this case the
mental or internal context) has changed for both the remember
and the forget group after a delay. Thus, the costs of DF might be
short-lived, but the effects of the enhanced list segregation – which
are reflected in the reduced intrusions from List 2 into List 1 – are
likely to remain long-term.
How can one differentiate between the retrieval inhibition and
list separation accounts as explanations for the reduced intrusions?
As stated above, in order to explain the reduced intrusions, the
retrieval inhibition account would predict that access to List 1 was
inhibited in Session 2, which should be reflected in diminished
recall of Set 1. In contrast, according to the contextual change
account, access to Set 1 in Session 2 should not be impaired in
comparison to a remember group, because presumably, the inter-
nal context has changed for both the remember and the forget
group after a 48 h delay, and thus, does not match the encoding
context for Set 1 in either group. Experiment 2 tested whether a
forget instruction impairs Set 1 recall when participants are asked
to recall Set 1 immediately after encoding Set 2 in Session 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
METHODS
The same methods as in Experiment 1b were used, with the excep-
tion that participants were asked to recall of Set 1 in Session
2, immediately after they had learned Set 2. Two experimental
groups were tested: One group received a forget cue, and one a
remember-cue at the beginning of Session 2, i.e., before learning
Set 2.
Twenty-eight undergraduate students (age range 18–35; 13
females, 15 males) from Lehigh University participated in the
experiment. They received course credit or financial compensation
for participation. Fourteen participants were randomly assigned
to each condition.
RESULTS
Learning set 1 and set 2
In order to assess possible differences in initial encoding, the num-
ber of trials to reach criterion (criterion: recall a minimum of 17
objects) was analyzed. A 2 (Condition: forget, remember)× 2 (Set:
Set 1 vs. Set 2) mixed ANOVA did not reveal any significant effects
(Fs≤ 1.74, p≥ 0.20). Thus, although the numerical difference was
in line with Experiment 1, the difference was not significant (Set
2: M = 3.43, Set 1: M = 3.75).
Set 1 recall
The number of objects recalled from Set 1 (see Figure 2) were
analyzed with a mixed ANOVA with Condition as the between-
subjects variable and Trial (1–4) as the within-subjects vari-
able. There was a significant effect of Trial [F(3, 78)= 19.48,
MSE= 0.997, p< 0.01], reflecting a linear increase in recalled
items with trials [F(1, 26)= 31.02, MSE= 1.63, p< 0.01]. Neither
FIGURE 2 | Mean percentages of objects correctly and falsely recalled
in the remember group and in the forget group in Exp. 2. Error bars
represent standard errors of means. Note: Participants were asked to recall
objects from Set 1. Objects that were falsely recalled from Set 2 are
labeled as Intrusions.
the main effect for Condition nor the interaction between Trial
and Condition reached significance (Fs< 1).
Intrusions
As expected, intrusions were at floor levels in both groups
(M = 1.25% for the forget, and M = 0.09% for the remember
group) and were therefore not analyzed statistically.
DISCUSSION
When I asked participants to recall Set 1 right after they had
encoded Set 2 in Session 2, Set 1 was recalled without intrusions in
both experimental groups. This confirms that the intrusion effect
takes time to develop (Hupbach et al., 2007). Most importantly,
Experiment 2 allows us to distinguish between retrieval inhibition
and list separation explanations for the reduced intrusions that
had been observed in Experiment 1a and 1b, particularly when the
forget cue was administered at the beginning of Session 2. Based
on the retrieval inhibition account, it was expected that the for-
get cue temporarily blocked access to Set 1, and thus, recall of Set
1 should be impaired in the forget group in comparison to the
remember group. Experiment 2 does not provide support for this
assumption, because no group differences were found when recall
was tested immediately after Set 2 encoding. One could argue that
retrieval inhibition might vanish with the progression of retrieval
trials. However, no difference in recall was found between the for-
get group and remember group for any of the retrieval trials, not
even the first retrieval attempt. Thus, the reduced intrusions from
Set 2 into Set 1 in Experiment 1a and 1b cannot be explained by
retrieval inhibition. Alternatively, based on the contextual change
account, I reasoned that recall might not be impaired in the forget
group, because the internal context shifted for both groups over
the 48 h delay period, and thus did not match the encoding context
for either of the two groups particularly well. Although one has
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 32 | 6
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hupbach When forgetting preserves memory
to be careful to interpret null effects1, the lack of recall differences
between the forget and the remember group in Experiment 2 is in
line with this reasoning. Furthermore, Experiment 2 suggests that
enhanced set differentiation (reflected in reduced intrusions when
tested after a delay) can unfold without impaired recall of Set 1.
As mentioned in the introduction, the DF effect has two facets,
impaired memory for the to-be-forgotten material (costs), and
improved memory for the material that is presented afterward
(benefits). Although the two effects do not always occur together
(see e.g., Bäuml, 2008), it is important to ask whether the reduced
intrusion effect of Experiment 1 is accompanied by an improved
memory for Set 2 objects. This was tested in Experiment 3.
EXPERIMENT 3
The long-term benefits of DF have rarely been studied (see Liu,
2001 for an exception). The two-factor account of DF (Sahakyan
and Delaney, 2005) assumes that the benefits (i.e., enhanced recall
of List 2 following DF) reflect the implementation of an improved
encoding strategy for List 2. Specifically, the forget instruction
causes people to rethink their encoding strategies, and to choose
a more sophisticated one for the new list. An improved encoding
strategy should have long-term consequences (Liu, 2001). There-
fore, I expected that instructing people to forget Set 1, especially
immediately before Set 2 encoding, would result in improved
memory for Set 2 in comparison to a control group. Intrusions
from Set 1 into Set 2 recall were not expected for any of the
experimental groups, because previous studies have shown that
intrusions only occur in one direction (from Set 2 into Set 1, but
not from Set 1 into Set 2 recall; Hupbach et al., 2007, 2009).
METHODS
The exact same methods as in Experiment 1a were used, with the
exception that all participants were asked to recall Set 2 instead of
Set 1 in Session 3.
PARTICIPANTS
Thirty-six undergraduate students (25 females, 11 males) from
Lehigh University participated in the experiment. They received
course credit or financial compensation for participation. Twelve
participants were randomly assigned to each condition (FC-1, FC-
2, control group). The control group was not asked to remember
Set 1 before learning Set 2, and thus resembles the control group
of Experiment 1a.
RESULTS
Learning set 1 and set 2
A 3 (Condition)× 2 (Set) mixed ANOVA revealed a significant
main effect of Set [F(3, 99)= 17.97, MSE= 1.20, p< 0.01]. Par-
ticipants needed fewer learning trials to reach criterion for Set
2 (M = 2.22) than Set 1 (M = 2.61), replicating Experiment 1.
1The observed difference between the forget- and remember-group was extremely
small (0.7 items, or 3.5%). A post hoc power analysis showed that given the group
sample sizes (N = 14) and observed SD (2.77 and 2.78), the paired sample t -test
had a power of 0.72 to detect a difference of 12% (a rather conservative estimate,
based on a recent study by Pastötter and Bäuml, 2010). Thus, the lack of statistical
significance is unlikely due to a lack of power.
Learning was comparable in all three conditions: there was no
main effect of Condition, and no interaction between Set and
Condition (F ≤ 1.38, p≥ 0.27).
Recall of set 2
The mean percentages of objects recalled from Set 2 and the mean
percentages of objects falsely recalled from Set 1 (intrusions) are
displayed in Figure 3. The number of objects recalled from Set
2 was analyzed with a 3 (Condition) by 4 (Trial) mixed ANOVA.
Only the main effect of Trial was significant [F(3, 99)= 17.97,
MSE= 1.20, p< 0.01], showing that recall improved over the
four retrieval trials [linear contrast: F(1, 33)= 31.45, MSE= 1.89,
p< 0.01]. There was no effects of Condition and no interaction
between Trial and Condition (both Fs< 1).
Intrusions from set 1 into set 2
As expected intrusions were at floor levels in all three groups and
were therefore not further statistically analyzed.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 3 shows that the forget cue did not improve mem-
ory for Set 2, regardless of when it was presented. This finding
contradicts my hypothesis of better memory performance in the
forget groups in comparison to the control group, based on the
assumption that the forget instruction should have caused partic-
ipants to implement a more successful encoding strategy for Set
2. However, in contrast to most DF studies, in the object-learning
paradigm, participants went through several learning trials until
they could recall a specified number of objects (17 out of 20
presented objects). Therefore, potential initial encoding strategy
differences among the different groups might have been “washed
out” over successive learning trials. Furthermore, in contrast to the
FIGURE 3 | Mean percentages of objects correctly and falsely recalled
in the different experimental groups in Experiment 3: the forget cue
was either given at the end of Session 1, the beginning of Session 2,
or was omitted (control). Error bars represent standard errors of means.
Note: Participants were asked to recall objects from Set 2. Objects that
were falsely recalled from Set 1 are labeled as Intrusions.
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costs of DF, the benefits are less reliably observed, and studies that
do find List 2 enhancements exert much less control over encoding
processes than in the current study, which leaves more room for
individual strategy choices (see Sahakyan and Delaney, 2010 for
further discussion).
Critically, and in contrast to most DF studies, the object-
learning paradigm implements 48-h time delays between Set 1,
and Set 2 presentation, and the final memory test. To my knowl-
edge, Joslyn and Oakes’ (2005) study on DF of autobiographical
events is the only published study that used a list-wise method and
various time delays. Similar to what was found in the present study,
the forget instruction did not result in enhanced remembering of
the events that followed the forget instruction. Future research has
to determine whether the enhanced memory for the new infor-
mation is a short-lived phenomenon due to the new information
being temporarily more accessible, or whether it is dependent on
using less stringent encoding procedures (Sahakyan and Delaney,
2010).
Intrusions from Set 1 into Set 2 recall were not found for any of
the experimental groups in Experiment 3. This replicates previous
studies that have shown that intrusions only occur in one direc-
tion (from Set 2 into Set 1, but not from Set 1 into Set 2 recall;
Hupbach et al., 2007, 2009). This is in line with the assumption
that consolidation and reconsolidation are affected by retroactive,
but not proactive interference. Alternatively, Set 2 memory was
encoded more recently than Set 1 memory, and therefore, might
be relatively immune to intrusions due to its strength.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When memories are reactivated, they re-enter a plastic state in
which they can be modified with new information. In the present
study I asked whether such modifications can be prevented, that is,
whether memory can be preserved, when people are instructed to
forget the original memory before new information is presented. I
combined the reconsolidation paradigm (that leads to integration
of new information into a reactivated memory) with a list-wise
DF paradigm (in which people actively attempt to forget a recently
encoded memory). Experiment 1 strongly suggests that memory
modifications can be prevented via forgetting instructions: the
influence of the spatial context, that usually triggers the incorpo-
ration of Set 2 objects into memory for the first set (Hupbach
et al., 2008; and control group of the Exp. 1a) could be overcome
when people were instructed to forget the first set, especially when
the forget instruction was given shortly before Set 2 encoding. This
shows that DF can affect not just very recent, but also more remote
and well-established memories, a finding that is new in the DF lit-
erature. The instruction to forget Set 1 might have encouraged
people to focus on the differences between the two sets, which
promoted increased set differentiation. Conversely, the remem-
ber instruction (or giving no specific instruction at all), might
have caused people to focus on the similarities between the two
episodes, promoting Set 2 integration. Indeed, Experiment 2 pro-
vides support for the view that the reduced intrusions in the forget
group were due to list segregation/isolation, rather than inhibition
of Set 1.
The present finding of reduced intrusions from Set 2 into Set
1 aligns with recent findings showing that the forget instruction
reduces intrusions in the traditional DF paradigm in which both
list are learned and retrieved within the same session (Lehman
and Malmberg, 2009; Sahakyan and Delaney, 2010; but see Spillers
and Unsworth, 2011). In reference to the context change account,
Sahakyan and Delaney explain the reduced intrusions by assuming
that the forget cue results in more distinct List 1 and List 2 contexts,
which in turn “serve as better retrieval cues for items from their
own list” (p. 1351). Intrusions in the present study were restricted
to Set 2 intruding into Set 1, whereas especially in Sahakyan and
Delaney’s study, List 1 also intruded into List 2. The finding of
bidirectional intrusions might depend on presenting both lists in
close temporal proximity. On the other hand, the unidirectional
intrusions in the object-learning paradigm are assumed to reflect
a reconsolidation process that integrates List 2 into List 1 mem-
ory. Specifically, returning to the same context or being instructed
to keep remembering Set 1 in Session 2 reactivate Set 1 memory,
allowing the newly presented Set 2 items to become incorporated
into Set 1 memory (Hupbach et al., 2007, 2008).
Interestingly, instructing people to forget Set 1 in Session 2 has
similar effects as a spatial context change between List 1 and List
2 presentation. Hupbach et al. (2008) found intrusions from Set 2
into Set 1 memory only when Set 1 and Set 2 were encoded in the
same spatial context, but not when Set 2 was encoded in a differ-
ent room. In the present study, spatial context was held constant
across all three conditions. However, intrusions were prevented
by the forget cue. This points to an interesting interplay between
internal and external context in the object-learning paradigm. It
seems that the internal context change can counteract the influ-
ence of the spatial context. This is especially interesting in the light
of the failure to accomplish the opposite, i.e., to mentally rein-
state the spatial context in a different environment: when placed
in a different spatial context in Session 2, mentally reinstating the
encoding context of Set 1 did not lead to intrusions from Set 2 into
Set 1 in Session 3 (Hupbach et al., 2008).
The study raises the general question of boundary conditions
for memory updating and reconsolidation. It has been proposed
and experimentally demonstrated that reconsolidation is only trig-
gered when there is a mismatch between what is expected based
on prior learning and what happens after the reminder (prediction
error; Morris et al., 2006; Lee, 2009; Sevenster et al., 2012). Another
boundary condition for memory reconsolidation is the strength
of a memory. Animal studies have shown that strong fear mem-
ories, when reactivated, are initially resistant to reconsolidation
(Suzuki et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2009). In a recent study, Hup-
bach et al. (2010) “overtrained” participants on Set 1 by increasing
the number of encoding trials. Overtraining markedly reduced
intrusions. Thus, stronger memories are somewhat resistant to
change, although not completely impermeable. And yet in other
situations, updating or integration requires verbal instructions.
In a paired-associates learning paradigm, the integration of new
paired-associates into the reactivated memory crucially depends
on giving participants a verbal instruction to do so. Without the
verbal instruction to add the new information, the second list
interfered with memory for the first list (Forcato et al., 2010).
Taken together, the present study demonstrates for the first
time that deliberate attempts to forget a memory can immunize
it such that the presentation of potentially interfering material
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has no effect, and the memory can be recalled unchanged in the
future. This way, the attempt to forget can have beneficial effects
on memory. This finding may become quite relevant in the context
of eyewitness testimony, where long-term memory modifications
can be troublesome and highly consequential (e.g., Loftus, 2005).
Chan et al. (2009) have shown that recalling a witnessed event
before presenting misleading information enhances the misinfor-
mation effect, that is people are more likely to adopt false details
as their true memories in a later memory test. The present study
suggests that the instruction to forget the witnessed event before
presenting related information might protect the memory from
being altered.
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